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Abstract
In this paper we study network structures in which the possibilities
for cooperation are restricted and can not be described by a cooper-
ative game. The benefits of a group of players depend on how these
players are internally connected . One way to represent this type
of situations is the so-called reward function, which represents the
profits obtainable by the total coalition if links can be used to coor-
dinate agents’ actions. The starting point of this paper is the work
of Vilaseca et al. [10] where they characterized the reward function.
We concentrate on those situations where there exist costs for estab-
lishing communication links. Given a reward function and a costs
function, our aim is to analyze under what conditions it is possible to
associate a cooperative game to it. We characterize the reward func-
tion in networks structures with costs for establishing links by means
of two conditions, component permanence and component additivity.
Finally, an economic application is developed to illustrate the main
theoretical result.
Keywords: cooperative game; network; reward function; costs func-
tion.
AMS Subject Classification: 90B10; 90B18; 91A12; 91A80.
∗∗Corresponding author. Email: ameseguer@uoc.edu
1
A.Meseguer and R.Ferreras 2
1 Introduction
In this paper, we will focus on a particular field of the scientific literature
that studies how networks integrate into cooperative games. The aim of this
work is to study how exogenous rules of sharing determine the benefits of
cooperation between agents. Additionally, we will consider those economic
situations in which the communication possibilities among a group of agents
are restricted and where the formation of connections between agents has a
cost.
Most part of communication takes place through networks, systems of
decentralized and bilateral relations between participants. In recent years
there has been a growing attention for the theoretical models which remark
the importance of the economic and social networks. These models help us
to understand how networks affect to economic outcomes and analyze how
networks are formed.
Myerson [6] was the precursor of the study of communication situations.
In his work he associated a situation where the possibilities for communi-
cation are restricted to the so-called network-restricted game, in which he
incorporates the benefits of cooperation and the communication restrictions.
Later, Borm et al. [3] contributed with a new approximation that was based
on the possible connections that permit communication among agents, and
not from the point of view of players. The modelization was made through
the idea of link game, that reflects for each subset of existent connections,
the value that will obtain the total coalition if only these communication
channels are feasible to players.
The previous works assume that the economic possibilities of agents can
be described via a cooperative game. From now on, we will omit this suppo-
sition. In this sense, it is known that there are situations where the profits
obtainable by a set of players do not only depend on the connected agents,
but futhermore they depend on how these players are internally connected.
These situations are represented via the so-called reward function, introduced
by Jackson and Wolinsky [5], which measures the benefits obtainable by the
grand coalition in the network. The main difference with respect to the link
game is that the link game is only defined for a concrete connection of the
network, while the reward function is defined over all set of possible links.
But there is a step behind where there are costs for forming links. The
formation of communication networks when there exists costs has been stud-
ied in different works as Bala and Goyal [2], Goyal [4], Jackson and Wolinsky
[5], Slikker and van den Nouweland [8] and Watts [11].
While the first three works study the formation of networks in paramet-
ric models of information transmission, Slikker and van den Nouweland [8]
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analyze the influence of the existence of costs for establishing links in formed
communication networks. For a wide summary of the literature we refer to
Slikker and van den Nouweland [9].
The starting point of our work is the modelling of Jackson and Wolinsky
[5] through the reward function, but taking into account the discussion in
Slikker and van den Nouweland [8]. Given a cooperative game it is always
possible to associate to it a reward function, however the inverse implication
is not always true. In this sense, Vilaseca et al. [10] characterized the reward
function, proving that a reward function has a unique cooperative game
associated if and only if the reward function satisfies two conditions: the
component permanence and the component additivity.
In this paper, we will follow the research line started by Vilaseca et al.
[10], with the difference that we will assume the existence of costs for estab-
lishing communication links between every two players.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2 we recall some basic
game theoretic notions and we provide some necessary definitions and con-
cepts about the Theory of Networks. In Sec. 3 we give the main result of
the paper, the characterization of the reward function when costs are taken
into account in the establishment of links. In Sec. 4 we show an economic
application of the theoretical result, relied on the macroeconomic vision of
the weight of some countries in the distribution of votes that proposes the
European Constitution based on demographic criteria. And finally, in Sec.
5 we conclude with some final remarks.
2 Notation and preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative games and solution concepts
A cooperative game is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} represents the
set of players and v is the characteristic function describing the gains of
cooperation, v(S) ∈ R, for each coalition S ⊆ N . It is always assumed that
v(∅) = 0.
These games are also referred to as cooperative games with transferable
utility or TU-games. The concept of transferable utility refers to the fact
that the proceeds from cooperation are transferable between the players.
In this paper we will be specially interested in 0-normalized non-negative
games, which is to say cooperative games where v({i}) = 0 for all {i} ∈ N
and v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N . To simplify notation, from now on we will write
i instead of {i} to refer to player i.
Players in a cooperative game are not just interested in profits obtainable
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in a coalition, futhermore they can be interested in what they individually
get from cooperation. In this sense, Game Theory provides single-valued
solution concepts, such as the well-known Shapley value [7] which distributes
the total value among players taking into account the concept of marginal
contribution. An allocation or payoff vector is a vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ Rn
that assigns to each player i ∈ N the payoff or profit xi that can be obtained
if he cooperates with the other players.
Given a cooperative game (N, v) the Shapley value φ(v) ∈ Rn is defined
as:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ i)− v(S)) , i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
2.2 Networks
In this section, we will focus on describing communication situations. The
main difference with the previous section is that there we assumed that all
coalitions of players could be formed, but in certain situations this is not the
case.
Given a set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, in order to be able to coordinate
their actions they have to be able to communicate. A communication network
that describes the bilateral channels of communication between players can
be represented by a graph (N,L) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players
that we will situate in the vertices or nodes of the graph and where these play-
ers are connected by a set of arcs or links L ⊆ LN = {{i, j}|i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}.
For instance, if N = {1, 2, 3} and L = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} then it indicates that
there is a link between individuals 1 and 2, a link between individuals 2 and
3, but there is no link between individuals 1 and 3.
The link {i, j} indicates that players i and j are directly connected in
the graph and can cooperate with each other without requiring the interme-
diation of other players. We say that i and j are connected in the network
if there is a path that joins them, that is to say, if there is a sequence of
players (i1, i2, . . . , it) such that i1 = i, it = j and {ik, ik+1} ∈ L for all
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t − 1}. If two players are connected, but are not directly
connected, we say that they are indirectly connected in the network.
A network (N,L) is complete if all pairs of players are directly connected
in the network, i.e., L = LN . Given a coalition S ⊆ N where |S| = 2, 3, . . . , n,
we denote with LS the structures of links that result in complete networks.
LS = {{i, j}|i, j ∈ S} is a structure of links where the players of S are all
directly connected and the rest of the players are not connected.
Note that if there are players who are not connected in a network, this
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means that they cannot communicate and, therefore, it rises to the notion of
cooperation components, i.e., a partion of the set of players N . We say that
i and j are in the same component C if they are connected, either directly
or indirectly. The set of components of the network (N,L) will be denoted
as N/L. To any component C we can associate a coalition that we will call
SC such that SC = {i ∈ N/i ∈ C}.
To coordinate actions between players of a component C, only players
of this component are relevant. Hence the network associated to the com-
ponent C is denoted L(C) = {{i, j} ∈ L|i, j ∈ C}, i.e., L(C) represents the
network where there are only the links of C and where the individual play-
ers k ∈ N\C are not connected with anyone. For example, if we consider
the network (N,L) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and L = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {4, 5}},
then the set of components of (N,L) is N/L = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}} and, for ex-
ample, the network associated to component C = {1, 2, 3} is L({1, 2, 3}) =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}}.
3 Characterization of reward function in net-
works structures with costs
3.1 Definition of reward function and costs function
There are some situations in which the economic possibilities of players can-
not be described by a cooperative game. Borm et al [3] used the so-called link
game to represent such situations, while Jackson and Wolinsky [5] defined
the so-called reward function which considers the internal structure of links
between players.
We will concentrate in Jackson and Wolinsky approximation via the re-
ward function. The reward function is a function that assigns a real value
r(L) to each set of links L ⊆ LN , that represents the profits obtainable by
the grand coalition in network (N,L) if the connections of L can be used to
coordinate players’ actions.
Additionally it is possible to consider that forming communication links
among players is not costless. Slikker and van den Nouweland [8] incorporate
costs for forming links and they assume that all links result in the same fixed
cost. We will work with a more general model of costs function where the
cost associated to each link can be different.
Definition 3.1 For all set of links L ⊆ LN , a costs function associated to
each possible connections is defined as a function:
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f : 2L
N → R where f(∅) = 0. (1)
For all cooperative game (N, v) and all costs function f(L) a reward
function r is associated in the following way:
r(L) =
∑
C∈N/L
v(C)− f(L) for all L ⊆ LN . (2)
That is to say, the value for a set of links L is defined as the profits that
would obtain the grand coalition if connections of L can be used to coordinate
players’ actions.
For this reward function and costs function two properties can be defined:
Definition 3.2 Given a set of players N and a function z defined on subsets
of LN , the function z is component permanent if it holds that:
z(L1) = z(L2) (3)
for all L1, L2 ⊆ LN such that N/L1 = N/L2.
Definition 3.3 Given a set of players N and a function z defined on subsets
of LN , the function z is component additive if it holds that:
z(L) =
∑
C∈N/L
z (L(C)) for all L ⊆ LN . (4)
3.2 Characterization of reward function
In this subsection we will focus on characterizing the reward function. To
be precise we will prove that given two functions, r and f , defined for all
L ⊆ LN , where f (∅) = 0, component permanence and component additivity
of r + f are necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique 0-normalized
associated cooperative game to exist that has as reward function exactly this
function.
Next we will check that if the reward function and the costs function
don’t generate externalities, then the value of the reward function is null for
the case where there is no connection between nodes.
Lemma 3.1 Given a set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that |N | ≥ 2, a
costs function f : 2L
N → R where f(∅) = 0 and a reward function r : 2LN →
R such that r + f is component additive, then r (∅) = 0.
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Proof: Without loss of generality we define r′ = r + f . Due to component
additivity of r′, then r′(L) =
∑
C∈N/L
r′ (L(C)) for any L ⊂ LN and so,
r′(∅) =
∑
i∈N
r′ (L(i)) =
∑
i∈N
r′ (∅)⇒ r(∅) + f(∅) = n · (r(∅) + f(∅)) .
Since by definition f(∅) = 0, then r(∅) = n · r(∅)⇒ r(∅) = 0.

The following theorem is the main result of this paper and characterizes
reward function in those situations where there are costs for establishing
links.
Theorem 3.1 Given a 0-normalized cooperative game (N, v), a costs func-
tion f (1) and the reward function r of the game (2), the function r + f
satisfies component permanence (3) and component additivity (4).
Conversely, given a costs function f and a function r : 2L
N → R such that
r + f satisfies (3) and (4), there exists a unique 0-normalized game (N, v)
such that its reward function is r.
Proof:
⇒) We have to prove that given a 0-normalized cooperative game (N, v),
a costs function f and a reward function r, then the function r + f
satisfies (3) and (4).
(1) Given L1, L2 ⊆ LN such that N/L1 = N/L2 and given a cooper-
ative game v and a costs function f , if we associate the reward
function defined in (2), then it satisfies that:
r(L1) =
∑
C∈N/L1
v(C)− f(L1)⇒ r(L1) + f(L1) =
∑
C∈N/L1
v(C),
r(L2) =
∑
C∈N/L2
v(C)− f(L2)⇒ r(L2) + f(L2) =
∑
C∈N/L2
v(C),
so,
r(L1) + f(L1) =
∑
C∈N/L1
v(C) =
∑
C∈N/L2
v(C) = r(L2) + f(L2).
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(2) We define r′ = r + f . So, now we have to prove that r′ satisfies
component additivity.
Without loss of generality, we consider the following components
structure N/L = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck}. Then, according to expression
(2) of the reward function associated to v, we have:
r′(L) =
∑
C∈N/L
v(C) = v(C1) + v(C2) + . . .+ v(Ck). (5)
From expression (2) and 0-normalization of v, the value for a
structure of links associated to a unique component Ci for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} is:
r′ (L(Ci)) =
∑
C∈N/L(Ci)
v(C) = v(Ci) +
∑
j∈N\Ci
v(j) = v(Ci).
Then, substituting in (5) we obtain:
r′(L) = v(C1) + v(C2) + . . .+ v(Ck) =
= r′(L(C1)) + r′(L(C2)) + . . .+ r′(L(Ck)) =
=
k∑
i=1
r′(L(Ci)) =
∑
C∈N/L
r′ (L(C)) .
Hence, we can affirm that r′ is component additive.
⇐) We have to prove that given a costs function f and a function r :
2L
N → R such that r + f satisfies (3) and (4), then there exists a
unique 0-normalized cooperative game v such that its reward function
is r.
We will divide the proof in two steps. First we will prove the existence
of the game and secondly the uniqueness.
To show the existence we will prove that there exists a 0-normalized
cooperative game v that satisfies the system of equations described by
(2).
Consider the following cooperative game where v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N
and v(S) = r(LS) + f(LS) for all S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2.
Consider L ⊆ LN such that L has a unique component that is not
a singleton and that is formed by players in coalition S. Then by 0-
normalization of v, and component permanence of r+ f , it holds that:
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r(L) + f(L) = r(LS) + f(LS) = v(S) = v(S) +
∑
j∈N\S
v(j).
Then, for such types of networks, v satisfies (2).
Similarly, consider now L ⊆ LN such that L has more than one com-
ponent that are not singletons, and let these components be formed by
coalitions S1, S2, · · · , Sk. Then by 0-normalization of v, and component
permanence and additivity of r + f , it holds that
r(L) + f(L) =
k∑
i=1
r(LSi) +
k∑
i=1
f(LSi) =
=
k∑
i=1
v(Si) =
k∑
i=1
v(Si) +
∑
j∈N\{S1∪S2∪···∪Sk}
v(j).
That is to say, v also satisfies condition (2).
Last, the case L = {∅} follows directly from Lemma 3.1.
Finally, to show uniqueness, suppose that there exist two 0-normalized
cooperative games v1 and v2 which are solution of the equations system
described by (2). Then there exists a coalition S ⊂ N, |S| ≥ 2, such
that v1(S) 6= v2(S). Then by (2) and 0-normalization of v1 and v2, it
holds that:
r(L(S))− f(L(S)) = v1(S) +
∑
j∈N\S
v1(j) = v1(S),
r(L(S))− f(L(S)) = v2(S) +
∑
j∈N\S
v2(j) = v2(S).
Equations which lead to a contradiction, because we had supposed that
v1(S) 6= v2(S).

The following corollary tells us that the 0-normalization is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the function r + f to be component additive.
Corollary 3.1 Let be (N, v) a cooperative game, f : 2L
N → R a costs func-
tion where f(∅) = 0 and r : 2LN → R its reward function, then (N, v) is
0-normalized if and only if r + f satisfies component additivity.
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Proof:
⇒) According to the proof of Theorem 3.1, if a game v is 0-normalized
then the function r + f is component additive.
⇐) If v is not 0-normalized, then
∑
j∈N
v(j) 6= 0⇒ r(∅) =
∑
j∈N
v(j)−f(∅) 6= 0,
applying Lemma 3.1 we can affirm that r+f is not component additive.
This leads to a contradiction and proves the corollary.

The following proposition shows that given a costs function and the re-
ward function for complete networks, then it is possible to obtain the value
of the reward function for the rest of links L ⊆ LN .
The interest of the result lies in that the complexity of the definition of
the reward function r is reduced, due to the fact that just associating its
value for complete networks, it remains determined.
Proposition 3.1 Given a set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that |N | ≥ 2,
a costs function f : 2L
N → R and a reward function r : 2LN → R such that
r + f satisfies conditions (3) and (4), then r is fully determined by f and
r(LSC ):
r(L) =
∑
C∈N/L
r(LSC ) +
∑
C∈N/L
f(LSC )− f(L) (6)
for all L ⊆ LN .
Proof: Without loss of generality, consider L ⊆ LN such that N/L =
{C1, C2, . . . , Ck} and consider L∗ ⊆ LN such that L∗ = {{r, j} ∈ L/r, j ∈ Ci}
for all i = {1, 2, · · · , k}. Observe that N/L∗ = N/L = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck}.
Hence, by component permanence (3) of r + f :
r(L) + f(L) = r(L∗) + f(L∗)⇒ r(L) = r(L∗) + f(L∗)− f(L) (7)
for all L,L∗ ⊆ LN .
By component additivity (4) of r + f :
r(L∗) + f(L∗) =
k∑
i=1
[r(LSCi ) + f(LSCi )]⇒
⇒ r(L∗) =
k∑
i=1
r(LSCi ) +
k∑
i=1
f(LSCi )− f(L∗).
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Replacing the previous expression in (7) we obtain:
r(L) =
k∑
i=1
r(LSCi ) +
k∑
i=1
f(LSCi )− f(L∗) + f(L∗)− f(L)⇒
⇒ r(L) =
∑
C∈N/L
r(LSC ) +
∑
C∈N/L
f(LSC )− f(L).

Economically the analysis of this expression tells that if all functions
are positive, then higher connections being formed between different agents
imply higher costs and so, the reward function takes a higher value for those
networks with less links, due to the fact that in this case there are less costs
and more benefits.
From the proof of Proposition 3.1 it can be deduced that the equations
system described previously in (6) is an indeterminate compatible system
with 2n − n − 1 free parameters, that is to say, it has so many degrees of
freedom as number of coalitions can be formed.
It is easy to check that from Proposition 3.1 it is also possible to obtain
the value of the costs function if we have the reward function and the values
of the costs function for complete networks. The expression in that case is:
f(L) =
∑
C∈N/L
f(LSC ) +
∑
C∈N/L
r(LSC )− r(L) (8)
for all L ⊆ LN .
3.3 Particular case with costs proportional to the num-
ber of links
Next we consider one of the most habitual cases, the one where the costs
function is proportional to the number of links:
f(L) = α|L| for all L ⊆ LN where α > 0. (9)
The goal is to analyze what type of structure needs to have the reward
function when the associated costs function is the one described previously
in (9) and, taking into account that r + f accomplishes conditions (3) and
(4).
From Proposition 3.1 it is possible to express r(L) as a function of pa-
rameter α, the number of links and the values of the reward function for
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complete networks. The value of the reward function for any connection,
considering proportional costs, is:
r(L) =
∑
C∈N/L
r(LSC ) + α(
∑
C∈N/L
|LSC | − |L|) (10)
for all L ⊆ LN .
The interpretation of expression (10) from the economic point of view
and considering that the costs function is increasing (α > 0) is that higher
number of links being formed between different agents of the network leads
to more costs and, so, to a decreasing network value.
4 Economic application: A macroeconomic
approach to the countries votes allocation
in European Constitution
In this section we compare the present assigned votes to different countries
in European Constitution according basically to demographic criteria with
the votes that would be assigned if other kind of criteria were followed, as
for instance the external commercial relationships of considered economies.
After the Lisboa Treaty, European Council decisions are taken according
to a complex weighting system mostly depending on the demographic weight
of each of the 24 European Union Member States. From the total 345 votes
attributable, countries with more percentage of votes are Germany, United
Kingdom, France and Italy with 29 votes, followed by Spain and Poland with
27 votes each one.
For reasons of data availability and to simplify the analysis, we will work
only with the following four countries: Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
The economic application will be modeled via a network structure, where
the different countries will be located in the nodes and the links will indicate
the existence of external trade between states. Graphically, the network
situation that we will study is represented in Figure 1.
In this sense we will consider, as indicator of international trade of goods
an aggregated economic magnitude, the exports flow detailed by countries
partners. Data referent to 2005, evaluated in millions of dollars, have been
obtained from OECD (http://www.oecd.org). With the aim of homogenizing
the difference of living standards we will correct the present exchange rate
by the purchasing power parity.
These data will permit us to obtain the value of the reward function for
each network structure, that will correspond with the increment generated
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Figure 1: Connections structure
in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), aggregated and with no exports, by
the fact of considering the external relations in terms of exports between
different countries (Step 1). Additionally, we consider the incorporation of
costs in the formation of links with the objective of satisfying conditions of
Theorem 3.1. Hence, we wil be able to construct an associated cooperative
game (Step 2), that will permit us to obtain the weights of each country in
terms of macroeconomic magnitudes (Step 3).
Step 1: As we aforementioned we define the values of networks structures
in terms of foreign relations. Specifically, the value of a particular network
will be given by the net productivity, in terms of value market of produced fi-
nal goods, generated by different countries when there are no trade exchanges
(GDP minus exports) plus the generation of value obtained through foreign
trade relations (exports) among connected countries in that network.
These values will permit us to construct the reward function. The reward
function indicates the increment in the value generation produced when we
pass from a situation where there is no trade movement to a situation where
foreign relations are taking into account.
Table 1 shows the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each one of the
states, as well as global exports, in millions euros. Table 2 shows exports
values, in millions euros, between different considered countries. The com-
putation of the reward function is let to the reader, due to the fact that
the number of combinations of connections structures is very high. We will
normalize with respect to the case of closed economies, L = {∅}, in order to
achieve the values of each one of possible networks. Without loss of gener-
ality, from now on we call Germany as player 1, France as player 2, Italy as
player 3 and Spain as player 4.
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Germany France Italy Spain
GDP 2122,1 1562,6 1232,7 740,1
Exports 802,1 371,7 248,4 151,1
Table 1: GDP and global exports (millions of euros)
exporters \ importers Germany France Italy Spain
Germany 56,37 42,79 19,56
France 90,12 41,27 34,14
Italy 57,86 34,88 13,78
Spain 37,80 33,99 20,75
Table 2: Exports between countries (millions of euros)
For example, the value of reward function for links structure L = {{1, 2},
{3, 4}}, is given by:
r({{1, 2}, {3, 4}}) =
= (2122, 1 + 1562, 6 + 1232, 7 + 740, 1)− (802, 1 + 371, 7 + 248, 4 + 151, 1)+
+(56, 37 + 90, 11) + (13, 78 + 20, 75) = 4265, 21
it means, the economic interpretation of this worth is the added value to GDP
minus exports generated by all four countries, that is obtained by considering
only the exports between Germany and France and between Italy and Spain.
The reader can easily check that [10] does not apply, since for example
r({{1, 2}, {1, 3}}) 6= r({{1, 3}, {2, 3}}), that is to say, condition of component
permanence is not satisfied.
Step 2: In the description of the model, we assume that formation of
communication links between any two players results in a non-negative ex-
ogenous cost. To isolate the effect of costs in structures that are formed, we
assume equal costs for all possible communication links.
The costs function of a network structure consists of a fix and a variable
part. Fixed costs are given by exports between countries which are not
connected in complete networks associated to each one of the components,
and the variable costs are proportional to the number of links of complete
networks associated to the components. The expression of costs function,
where XL represents exports between connected countries of network L, is
given by the following equation:
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f(L) =
∑
C∈N\L
XLSC \L(C) + α
∑
C∈N\L
|LSC | where α ≥ 0, (11)
and where by definition f(∅) = 0.
So for instance, the value of the costs function for the connections struc-
ture L = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}} is given by:
f({{1, 2}, {1, 3}}) = X{{1,2},{1,3},{2,3}}\{{1,2},{1,3}} + |{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}|α
= (41, 27 + 34, 88) + 3α
By the definition of the reward function and the costs function, it is easy
to check that as much component permanence condition as component addi-
tivity condition of function r + f are satisfied, therefore, following Theorem
3.1 we can associate a cooperative game to the reward function.
To obtain the cooperative game associated to the reward function we have
to solve the equations system described in expression (2). As it is deduced
from proof of Theorem 3.1, the solution of the system is quasi immediate.
Given the costs function described in (11), the cooperative game (N, v),
where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and v is expressed in millions of euros, associated to
the previous reward function has the following characteristic function:
v(∅) = 0 v({1, 2}) = 146.49 + α v({1, 2, 3}) = 304.5 + 3α
v({1}) = 0 v({1, 3}) = 100.66 + α v({1, 2, 4}) = 271.99 + 3α
v({2}) = 0 v({1, 4}) = 57.36 + α v({1, 3, 4}) = 192.55 + 3α
v({3}) = 0 v({2, 3}) = 76.16 + α v({2, 3, 4}) = 178.83 + 3α
v({4}) = 0 v({2, 4}) = 68.14 + α v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 483.33 + 6α
v({3, 4}) = 34.53 + α
Precisely, the value of the game for any coalition S coincides with the
value of the reward function for the component associated to this coalitions
plus a proportional cost α ≥ 0 to the number of links of the complete network
associated to the component.
An implication of the increasing costs function is that higher number of
foreign exchanges between countries leads to more benefits.
Step 3: Once the cooperative game has been obtained, the following step
consists in using an external distribution rule to determine the payments to
different countries.
The individual allocation that we will use is the Shapley value, which
is an extension of the Myerson value used for situations where there are
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communication restrictions (Aumann and Myerson [1]). According to this
concept solution, the share-out of the total profits is:
φ(v) = (150.685 + 1.5α, 143.825 + 1.5α, 104.105 + 1.5α, 84.715 + 1.5α) .
If we take into account the economic criteria of foreign openness, Ger-
many is the state which had to receive a higher votes percentage in European
Constitution, followed by France, Italy and Spain. If we compare these per-
centages with the ones assigned following demographic criteria we observe
that they differ. On the one hand the sharing that follows the demographic
criteria assigns to Germany, France and Italy the same number of votes, but
on the other hand Spain is the one which gets less percentage of votes. Note
that the costs effect over different countries is totally marginal, due to the
fact that by the own definition of the costs function those costs are included
additively in the characteristic function.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we have studied situations where communication between
players can be restricted and where the formation of these communication
links has a cost. To do it, we consider the reward function, introduced by
Slikker and van den Nouweland [9], as the analysis tool. The reward function
is a function that assigns to each connections structure formed by players and
links, a value that indicates the profits obtainable by the grand coalition in
this situation.
Given a set of players and a cooperative game, it is always possible to
associate a reward function to the game. However, it is not always possible
to associate a cooperative game to a reward function. Following Vilaseca et
al. [10], we characterize the reward function for these situations where the
establishment of relations among agents has a cost.
So given a reward function and a costs function, we show which condi-
tions must be satisfied to have a unique associated cooperative game. These
conditions are the component permanence and the component additivity of
the function that is the sum of the reward function and the costs function.
This is the main result of the paper.
Futhermore, as a consequence of the main result we prove that given a
cooperative game, a costs function and its reward function, then the game is
0-normalized if and only if the function that results from the sum of r and f
is component additive.
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Once we have the theoretical tool, we show an empirical application of
the result. The economic example that we present compares the actual distri-
bution of votes that assigns the European Constitution to different countries
according to demographic criteria with the distribution that would take place
if we would consider macroeconomic criteria such as the foreign commercial
relationships.
According to this macroeconomic approach of external commercial rela-
tions, the state that should receive more percentage of votes is Germany,
followed by France, Italy and Spain, allocation which differs from the one
imputed following demographic criteria.
With respect to future research lines, from the theoretical point of view
one of the main objectives is to analyze what conditions must satisfy the
reward function in order to have a unique cooperative game not necessarily 0-
normalized. From the empirical side, we will apply this technique to the study
of other kind of networks, such as logistic or telecommunication networks.
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